Controlling A City's Wealth by Kirshner, Edward & Morey, James
Controlling a City's Wealth 
The Lessons of New Town Development 
by EDWARD M. KIRSHNER and JAMES MOREY 
When a private developer builds a new town, he stands to make a fat profit. If the town owns and develops itself, that profit goes _ro the residents. Some implications for change in existing cities .. 
Oakland, California, is the "urban crisis" in micro-
cosm. Unemployment is high and average incomes 
low. The city has more than its share of hard-core 
poor, who hardly get by on welfare payments, and a. 
large number of blue-collar workers, who live only a· 
little above the poverty line. Housing and education 
are deteriorating. Public transportation is inadequate, 
medical care hard to come by, the environment 
increasingly foul. The city, so runs the conventional 
wisdom, is too "poor" to ·provide what its citizens 
need. As with Oakland, so with most American cities: 
hence the "urban crisis." 
Yet a glance at Oakland, while confirming that 
there is a good deal of poverty, would turn up a good 
deal of wealth as well. Many of those who work in 
Oakland earn substantial, even handsome, salaries. 
More to the point, Oakland is by no means eco-
nomically underdeveloped. It is a leading transporta-
tion, commercial, and industrial center, and it boasts 
more than the usual complement of banks, insurance 
companies, and real e~tate developers. Few of theie 
are on the verge of bankruptcy, as the impressive 
downtown offices testify. Wages and salaries are being 
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earned, profits made, real wealth produced. Why then 
the apparent poverty, .both individual and municipal? 
. Part of the discrepancy results from the highly 
unequal incomes that a capitalist economy generates, 
and the fact that the wealthy in particular often don't 
live where they work. Jobs that pay well are 
o.utnumbered by jobs that don't, not to mention 
those people. with no jobs at all, and Oakland's 
well-to-do residents are vastly outnumbered by the 
less fortunate. Many of the better off live in 
Piedmont, a separate city totally surrounded by 
Oakland (and much of the industry is in Emeryville, 
an industrial city cut out of Oakland). The economic· 
base that the city taxes for public services is thus 
. limited. 
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A more significant part of th.e discrepancy has to 
do with ownership of wealth itself, and the ability to 
tap.directly the income that wealth creates. Oakland's 
businesses are out to make money, which many of 
them have done quite successfully. They are free to 
use their income to pay high executive salaries .or to 
provide luxurious work space for their office staff-or 
they are free to reinvest it to make more money. The 
. f1city goverritnent, iri contrast, owns very few produc-
tive assets. Those that it does own or control, such as 
the Port of Oakland and the Coliseum, are quite ·· 
profitable but return little surplus for general use by 
the city. 
The city thus relies for the bulk of its revenue on 
taxing power, which·nins up against the obstacle just . 
mentioned. Should it judge, for example, that the 
private market is not providing many of its citizens 
with adequate housing relative to their needs, it 
would still be unable to provide the housing. The 
money simply isn't in the municipality's till, and 
there is seemingly no p()liiically feasible way. at least throu~ con\'entional means, to get it. Oak.larid is not 
an extreme example:- the problem plagues nearly, all 
cities in the Uiiited States. Neither they nor the great 
majority ()f their ciQZe!lS have ariy ~itect access to the 
income~pr~ducing wealth that surrotinc;ls them. Reforrri~rs and citizerts' groups wor~ing for change. 
in urban areas fmd themselves. caught in .. a bind. 
Communities or specl8l-iriterest constituencies may 
demand better housing; better schools, mote ieachers, 
_better-trained police, and:so f~rth; but~ long as they 
do not seek to change th~ fu~damental structure of 
the urban economy, )hey ate faced with virtually 
unanswerable arguments .from the political establish-
ment. The city goverrunent may provide a little bit of 
. . .·.f . . 
. . 
new public houstng or c:me .attractive new school, but 
when it comes to going: beyond such tokens .its cry of 
poverty appe,ars to ring tn~e. The usual result is either 
immediate discouragement, which helps to account 
for the rapid rise and fall of many insurgent com-
munity group_s; or a plea to Washington for help. 
Although the federal government has money, fighting 
the White House is even harder than fighting City · 
Hall, and federal. subsidies (in anything like the scale 
required to meet citizens' demands) are seldom 
forthcoming except to the wealthy. 
We believe that a more effective str:ttegy for those 
seeking change in urban areas is to attack the problem 
at its roots, and to begin to change basic structures of 
economic ownership and controt If some part of the 
revenue created by economic activity can be chan· 
neled directly to the public treasury, the city will be 
able to provide Services and facilities which it 
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otherwise could not. The amount of revenue from 
ownership may often be quite substantial, and success 
in bne sector of the economy can provide the 
political and economic base for extending the domain 
of municipal control. We propose, in short, that 
change in the cities needs to be based on. a program of 
community ·ownership-of real estate primarily, but 
also of utilities and even some businesses and indus-
tries. A city that owned itself-that was able to tap 
directly the income created by economic activity 
within its boundaries-would no longer be poor. And 
the direction of major resources would be in the 
hands of the citizens, not, as now, in the hands of 
largely nonresident corporate managers and private 
stockholders. 
' How might community ownership work, and how 
much of a difference would it make? One way to 
answer the question is to look at the hypothetical 
case of building a new town. The new town starts 
from scratch. Its costs of development can be 
calculated with a high degree of accuracy, as can its 
expected level of economic. activity. Looking at new 
town development, w.e think, clarifies the nature of 
the urban economy, and demonstrates how com-
munity ownership could bring about the benefits we 
claim. 
New Town De,elopment 
Imagine, then, a prototypical new town, to be 
developed over a period of fifteen years.1 The town 
will house 100,000 people, or roughly 31,000 fam· 
ilies. It is "self-contained," not a bedroom suburb; 
there will be jobs provided in the immediate vicinity 
for all the working residents. The site is 25-50 miles 
from the core cities of the San Francisco Bay region, 
and several miles distant from regional services such 
as freeway interchanges and gas trunk lines. Its 
residents are expected to make, on the average, 
$10,000 to $12,000 a year per family, a level about 
equal to the current regional median income. The 
homes are row, town, or "patio" houses, with some 
low-rise apartments, averaging out to 12 dwelling 
·units an acre (Table 1). 
With these basic assumptions-and a number of 
more detailed ones-the costs of developing the town 
can be calculated with a fair degree of precision. 
Figuring the costs of development tells us how much 
the average family would have to pay to live in the 
town. Breaking the costs down by category shows 
where the money that each family pays ends up. We 
will calculate the costs of building the town under 
two ownerShip models, conventional profit-oriented 
development and nonprofit community-owned de· 
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velopment. The comparison between the two, we 
think, tells us a good deal about how to change the 
imbalance of wealth in urban areas. 
TABLE I: Characteristics of the New Town Prototype 
Grou Income per Family 
Disposable Income per Family 
Families 
Population 
Jobs in the Town 
Industrial 
Primary Office 
Service, Govt. 
Distance from Metropolitan Core Cities 
Distance from Regional Access 
Raw Land Price 
$10,000/year 
S 9,000/yeu 
31,000 
I 00,()()().11 0,000 
35,000 
10,000 
3,000 
22,000 
25-50 miles 
4-6 miles 
S 2,500/acre 
In new town construction, one category of costs 
("hard" costs) represents th~ outlay for land pur· 
chase, development of public facilities such as roads 
and sewers, and construction of buildings. This 
category also includes overhead charges to the new 
town developer (such as the high salaries he must pay 
skilled managers), interest on construction loans, and · 
subcontractors' overhead and profit. In looking at the 
two models of development, we take these as fixed 
costs (Table 2). 
TABLE 2: Costs of the Prototype 
Throup Completion, in millions of 1972 Bay Ala doUars 
Land Development 'and lnfrutructure 
Traditionally private 
Site purchase $18 
Land development in town 
(excluding major roads and 
major water and sewer lines) 96 
sub-total S 114 
Traditionally quasi-public (including buildings) 
Medical $24 
Religious, institutional 20 
Utilities 60 
sub-total S 104 
Traditionally public (including buildinp) 
Major roads, major water and 
sewer lines 
Schools 
Parks and· recreation, community 
facilities and equipment 
sub-total 
Total land development and infrastructure 
Traditionally Private Structures 
Residential Buildings 
Industrial Buildings 
Commercial and office buildings 
Total traditionally private structures 
TOTAL TOWN COSTS 
$38 
70 
37 
$145 
$635 
s 69 
s 86 
s 363 
s. 790 
$1,153 
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The other category of costs depends on ownership 
and financing arrangements, the variables we will 
examine. The most significant figure here is whatever 
profit the developer expects to get, which is a cost in 
the sense that the residents will ultimately have to 
pay it. Also included in this latter category are such 
expenses as return to outside investors, interest on 
loans to cover land purchases, and property taxes 
during the development period. All these depend on 
how the process of development is organized, and are 
considered separately in the two development models 
described below. 
The Profit Model. In the usual pattern of new town 
development in the United States, the "prime devel-
oper" is a private, profit-making corporation. The 
corporation buys the various parcels of land and 
develops the property; that is, it provides roads, 
sewers, business locations and buildings, some public 
buildings, apartments, and houses or construction 
sites. It then markets the new parcels and buildings 
for sale or rental to homeowners, businesses, other 
· landlords, or builders. 
This development process converts low-valued 
rural land to highly valued urban land. For example, 
to use figures selected for simplicity alone, the land 
might cost the developer $2,500 an acre to purchase. 
The whole land-development process described above 
might bring the per-acre cost to $10,000. But when 
the developer is through, he has an incipient city, and 
land prices will be roughly what they would be in 
other cities of comparable size and location. This 
might be as much as $50,000 an. acre in the case of 
commercial ·land. The difference between costs of 
development and income from sale or rental is the 
developer's profit. 
Often this difference is substantial, and new town 
development is potentially quite lucrative. It is an 
enormous undertaking, to be sure, requiring large 
amounts of capital investment and carrying with it a 
considerable risk. For these reasons, new town 
development is not as widespread as one would 
otherwise expect. But a successful new town, like 
Columbia, Maryland, enables the prime developer and 
his investors to realize a substantial profit. 
Financial calculations for the profit-making model 
of development ·normally take something like the 
following form. The developer establishes separate 
accounts for residential properties on the one hand 
and commercial and industrial properties on the 
other. He typically will develop residential property 
and sell it out to homeowners or builders at prices 
sufficient to produce an 18 to 20 percent profit on 
12 
the money he has put in. 2 He will not sell the commercial and industrial properties, however; these will be rented, and their expenses and income accounted separ~tely. ·Over the entire period of development, th~ net income from leasing com· mercia! and inc:lliStrial property wiU normally provide a return of niote than 29 percent on investment. We have foJlowed this practice in 'tost estimates for profit development of our prototype. The hard costs, . toge~her with the expected .return to the developer, his interest on loans, etc., make up the total cost· of the project under this model. If we divide up the' residential portion of the total among all the families who will live there, we get the average cost per family of entry into the new town {Citizen's Entrance Fee, or ·CEF).3 For the prototype, this 
, figure comes to some $25,000. 
' This is not, it . should be noted, a lump-sum 
.·'·. paynient ·which ·the entering family normally would mab at a giwn point iJ1 time. It is rather the capitpl cost of entr)', and includes the purchase price of the homeOwner's house and land; his or her share of the ' 
. cost of public facilities such as roads; and his or her 
. share of whatever profit, interest, and overh~ad 
· expenses the · developer assigns to the residential aceount. It does not mclude operational costs, such as 
. monthly. utility. payments or the cost of nwntainmg the roads. Since it is the capital costs that vary between the two models, we use the CEF for the sake of comparing them more easily. w
1
e wiU translate it into monthly payments below. 
Nonprofit D.evelopment. Now ~up~ose the developer is not a profit-making corpor~tion out to maximize return on. investment,. but some sort of nonprofit community group. 'Suppose too that this group has a lower-income constituency, and that its purpose is to provide new-tow~· housing for all future residents at the lowest possible cost. The . goal of any specific group in practice could as well be providing better schools, reducing the cost of health care, creating more open space, or some combination of objec:tives. We will assume, however, that all available money is used to cut housing costs, since this makes the effect of nonprofit development clearer. And we will show that nonprofit development will in fact make signifi· cant amounts of money available for this purpose. On the first go-round, a group concerned with providing cheap housing might look to more conven-tional methods of cutting costs. For example, it might seek to reduce the physical costs of housing. Since housing in our prototype is roughly 70 percent of the total capital expenditure for which the family is responsible, a 10 percent reduction in housing costs 
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translates into a 7 percent reduction in CEF. Another tactic might be to seek out federal subsidies, for instance through the New Communities Act of 1970, which provides federally guaranteed loans for new town construction, or through Section 236 mortgage· interest subsidies. Nonprofit community ownership does not preclude any of these methods for cutting the price of housing. But in itself it is a much more wwerful device than any available subsidies or other price-reducing tactics. A community-owned new town could provide housing far more cheaply than a conventional profit-oriented new town because the 
community would control the wealth that the devel· opment process created. Let us return to our notion of CEF-the capital costs for which each family will be responsible-and see why this is true and how much of a diff!lrence community ownership makes. In calculating CEF under the nonprofit com-
munity-owned model, the hard costs of development do not .. change. ·ne nature of the town, m other words, remains the same: the same standards of 
.construction, the same proportion of commercial and mdustrial property, the same provision of public facilities. What. does change is the flow of money from development. First, there is no separate account for residential as vs. commercial and industrial prop· er:ties. Instead, net income from renting commercial and industrial property goes .to the community-and is used, in our model, to reduce the cost of housing. Second, the developer {in this case, the community group) receives no profit on housing per se. It is provided to the residents at cost, so the housing portion of CEF is reduced by the 18-20 percent profit (on the developer's investment) we allowed m the first model. Through these changes alone. total CEF goes down by roughly 23 percent, or close to $6,000 per family (Table 3). 
TABLE 3: CEF under Profit and Nonprofit Sponsorship ~nd Ownership of Real Property 
TotalCEF 
Profit 
Nonprofit 
Percentase SaYinp 
. under Nonprofit 
Absolute Savfnp 
under Nonprofit 
$25,400 
$19,500 
23% 
$5,900 
The process of realizing these savings is this. As the town is developed and after development, its non· profit owners will receive a certain net income from 
.the commercial and industrial property which they rent .out. This money is used to pay part of the 
KIRSHNER-MOREY 
interest charges on money borrowed at the beginning 
to finance housing. Because the homeowner is not 
responsible for paying these interest charges, his or 
her CEF goes down. 
In effect, those who rent commercial and indus· 
trial property are subsidizing homeowners. This may 
seem "unfair," but remember that the comme~cial 
and industrial properties in the new town are rented 
at the same rates as similar properties in other towns. 
These properties are valuable largely because they are 
near a populated area, where residents provide a labor 
force, market, and supporting services. Companies 
thus find it worthwhile to locate there, even at u~ban 
rental rates. Since the residents in effect create the 
value, it seems reasonable-if this is our goal-to apply 
that increased value toward reducing their CEFs. In a 
profit-oriented new town, of course, the developer 
would argue that he created the value by his 
entrepreneurial efforts, so he is entitlec:t to the profits. 
But here, the entrepreneurial role is assumed by the 
residents as a group (or is done for them on a 
limited-fee basis), and they pocket the benefits in the-
form of cheaper housing. 
The fact that the developer receives no profit on 
the housing sector also contributes to a reduction in 
CEF. This portion of the savings comes about because 
the process of investment is different in the two I 
models. In the fust, we assumed that the developer 
put up 25 percent of the money (his "equitY 
capital") and figured housing-site prices to allow for 
an 18-20 percent return on this investment. The rest 
of the money for development would have been 
borrowed from banks, at a ftxed rate of interest (for 
the calculations we assumed 8 percent, although with 
a 4 percent rather than 3 percent inflation factor this 
would come to 9 percent today). In the nonprofit 
model, we assume that all the money is borrowed at 
fvced interest . rates. We thus eliminate the higher 
return on investment which the private developer 
demands for his own money. 
Would such investment be forthcoming for a 
nonprofit new town development group? Given suf· 
ficient political strength and technical expertise ( ob· 
viously significant conditions), there is good reason to 
think that money would be available even though the 
developer was not the traditional risk-taking, profit· 
making capitalist. In fact, money that the nonprofit 
group borrowed might even come at lower interest 
rates than a private developer could command. For 
one thing, the nonprofit developer is a quasi-public 
entity, and might in fact be a municipal or county 
government itself. ·A higher proportion of expendi· 
tures, both traditionally governmental and other, 
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could therefore be financed through public agency 
bonds, which carry lower interest rates because they 
are tax-exempt. If the venture were relatively safe-
for example, if the bonds were guaranteed by the 
state, as with the New York Urban Development 
Corporation-effective interest rates on bonds could 
be as little as five or six percent. Even if state 
guarantees were not available, whatever money the 
town borrows is guaranteed by its taxing power, not 
simply by the profitability of any particular project (as would be the case with the private developer). 
Another investment device which the nonprofit 
new town might use is "tax-shelter" investment. 
·Federal income-tax laws allow investors to deduct 
from taxable income certain kinds of expenses 
incurred in real estate development, such as property 
taxes and interest on construction loans, and in real 
estate ownership, such as depreciation. The nonprofit 
developer and the investor establish what is called a 
limited partnership arrangement; through this, the 
investors can "oWl)" the development for tax pur· 
poses without assuming control, which remains in the 
develo~r's hands. The return to the investor· is 
primarily in the form of lower taxes, and not any 
significant payment of interest by the developer. The 
nonprofit new town could thus raise an appreciable 
amount of money with little interest payment. 
Both these mechanisms-tax-exempt bonds and 
tu-Shelter investment-are an indirect subsidy to the 
new town from the federal government, which 
absorbs the tax loss. Neither of them is a particularly 
desirable element of federal tax policy. But they do 
exist, and low-income groups should be able to use 
~hem for their purposes as easily as the wealthy for 
whom they were designed. And they do suggest that 
there is no reason in principle that a nonprofit new 
town could not attract outside investment. 
Finally, given our assumptions about the town's 
desire to build low and moderate-income housing, 
some investment might not come from profit· 
oriented investors at all, but from socially oriented 
sources such as churches, mutual insurance com· 
panies, union pension funds, foundations, and univer~ 
sities. These institutions, while demanding some ftxed 
return on their investment (we assumed 7-8 percent, 
amounting to 8-9 percent today), would not demand 
as high a return as conventional private investors. And 
they might be persuaded to invest on social grounds 
even if the venture were not as safe as other options 
open to them. 
If none of these devices were used, and if all 
financing (except equity capital) was exactly the 
same in the two models, nonprofit community-owned 
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development would still allow significantly cheaper 
housing. CEF would be reduced by 20 percent, or 
roughly $5,000, rather than by 23 percent and 
$6,000. But since the form of investment is likely to 
differ in the nonprofit case, our primary comparison 
of CEF reflects this fact. 
Utilities and Businesses 
If the primary goal is to reduce the costs of housing 
to residents, there are other sources of income which 
can be tapped by the new town as well. One obvious 
example is the town's utility system: electric power, 
gas, telephone, even cable .TV. In conventional new 
towns, utilities are under private ownership. They are 
provided by outside companies who charge rates high 
enough to realize a sizable profit on investment. Yet 
in some respects they are the most natural operating 
venture fc,>r community ownership. They are con· 
structed alo.n.s with the usual public infrastructure of 
roads, sewers, water lines, and so forth. The ne"' 
town developer· must at least help to plan and 
coordinate · their c~>nstruction. In some cases, the 
developer must also finance or "front" the money for 
them. Most importantly, they are natural monopolies 
since local. residents are a captive· market. Although 
private ownership is most common, they have a 
.historY' of ·muniCipal, cooperative, or other public 
ownership arrangements as well. 
Utility payments, in conventional new towns, go 
· to the outside companies which provide the various· 
. services, and in some cases to the developer himself. 
Since utility payments are .operational costs rather 
than capital . costs, they are not included in the 
calculation of CEF. Some part of these payments, 
though, is profit, or net return on investment. In the 
nonprofit model, the community itself provides the 
utilities, with ties to outside utility suppliers as 
· .. necessary. Given the same . utility rates to residents, 
the profit portion of their payments will return to the 
public treasury. Again, the community uses this 
money to pay part of the interest on housing 
loans-which reduces the residents' CEFs further. The 
. ' effect would be the same if we simply deducted ibis 
··. • money frorri the residents' utility bills, making 
utilities that much cheaper. Using the money to pay 
interest on loan$, however, incorporates it into CEF 
and thus facilitates comparison of the two models. 
For the prototype, we calculated expected net 
income from electric power, gas distribution, local 
telephone service (with a tie in to AT&T for outside 
service) and the entire cable TV system. The bor· 
rowed capital which this money could pay for 
amounts to some '$2,500 per family, or a reduction in 
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CEF of I 0 percent more. 4 Property ownership and 
utility ownership together reduce CEF by more than 
$8,000 or roughly 33 percent.' For comparison, 
physical costs of housing units would have to be 
reduced almost 50 percent to achieve similar savings. 
Another possibility-to carry the idea of com· 
munity ownership to its logical conclusion-is com· 
munity-owned commercial and industrial operations. 
With rare exceptions, business enterprises in Amer-
ican new towns are owned and operated by private 
companies, just as they are in existing cities. Yet 
there are precedents for community or cooperative 
ownership of some such enterprises in new towns in 
this c,ountry as well as in Europe. Examples can be 
found in the retail consumers' cooperative of Green-
belt, Maryland; the original community-trust-owned 
department store (among other cooperative stores) of 
Welwyn Garden City in England; and the coopera-
tively owned housing construction companies that 
produce much of the housing for Swedish new towns •. 
Outside new towns, of course, the viability of 
, cooperative ownership and operation of commercial 
ventures, though they are not widespread, has been 
demonstrated in many countries for decades. Con-
tinuing to work on the assumption that the residents, 
by their very presence, make profitable enterprise 
possible, it is not unreasonable that part of that profit 
should be returned to them in the form of a 
reduction in housing costs. 
Though we have not carried out detailed calcula-
tions of community-Owned businesses for the new 
town prototype described in this article, we did so for 
a smaller prototype. This smaller town, seen as an 
expansion of a rural village with roughly 20,000 
eventual inhabitants, would have a mixed industrial 
and agricultural economic base. Assuming commmity 
ownership. of a majority of commercial ventures 
(retail shops and services, professional and office 
services, wholesale suppliers) and a minority of 
industrial ventures gives us a reduction in CEF of 
roughly 18 pereent. If we add in a sizable coopera· 
tively run agricultural sector, we can further reduce 
CEF 6 percent. For this smaller town, community 
ownership of all the sectors (real estate, utilities, 
commercial-industrial, and agricultural) gives a total 
savings of some 52 percent. CEF in this case is 
reduced from nearly $24,000 to slightly more than 
$11 ,000. 5 In the larger town represented by our 
"self-contained" prototype, savings from nonprofit 
ownership schemes would likely be as much or more. 
Several conclusions emerge from these figures. 
·Total savings due to nonprofit ownership of a 
reasonable portion of commercial and industrial 
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enterprises, in addition to real estate and utilities, 
may cut capital costs to families roughly in half. To 
achieve a similar reduction, physical costs of housing 
would have to be reduced by two-thirds, an un· 
feasible proposition. Savings due to nonprofit owner· 
ship and operation of enterprises are about the same 
as savings resulting from ownership of real estate. 
Thus, the community's involvement in operating 
businesses, a relatively active, difficult, and risky 
position, may produce monetary rewards only equal 
to those expected from the ~:ommunity's fairly 
passive role as landlord. Net returns to the com· 
munity relative to invested capital, however" are 
somewhat greater in the case of enterprise ownership. 
Finally, as would be expected, 1i11ancial terms have a 
significant impact on total savings under nonprofit 
ownership. For eXample, an increase in interest rates 
from 7 to 8 percent in the nonprofit case, with no 
corresponding change in the pro.fit, case, reduces 
savings proportionally from 52 to 44 percent. 
Monthly Payments and Income uvels. The proof of 
the pudding, of course, comes when we translate our 
CEF figures into annual housing costs. Making this 
conversion gives us the amount each family must be 
prepared to pay for its accommodations, and thus the 
approximate income that each family must command 
if it is to move in. Since CEF represents the capital 
cost of entry into the town, we assume that it 
translates into a monthly mortgage payment at the 
going rate of interest. The mortgage would be large 
enough to cover both the cost of the house and land 
on the one hand and each family's share of public 
facilities on the other. To this capital expenditure we 
have to add operating expenses, the same in both 
models, if houses or apartments are sold to individ· 
uals. These include an allowance for real depreciation 
of buildings, and an allowance for maintenance, 
property taxes, and vacancies. 6 
If the houses and apartments are sold to residents 
rather than rented, the profit-oriented development 
of our prototype results in a $3,000 annual housing 
cost per family, or $250 per month. 7 If we assume 
that housing costs amount to 20 percent of income 
(which most economists take as a reasonable stan· 
dard), then the prospective resident must earn 
$15,000 a year to move in. With the same prototype 
and the same assumptions-changing only from profit 
development to community-owned development-the 
annual housing cost is $2,300 aud the required 
income drops to $11,500. If we then add the 
possibility of tax-shelter sale for the nonprofit model 
as outlined above, the figure drops to $10,500. For 
the smaller rural town, if we add the possibility of 
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partial ownership of enterprises and·agriculturalland, 
the required income may drop as low as $8,200 
(Table 4). If rent is a higher proportion of income 
(for example, 25 percent, as is often true at lower 
income levels}, required income could be even less. 
TABLE 4: Required Average Incomes 
under Profit and Nonprofit Assumptions 
A. Profit 
Investor holds for rent 
Investor sells to residents 
$18,000 
15,000 
B. Nonprofit (real estate and utilities) 
Individual mortgages 
Group mortgage 
C. Phased tax-shelter sale plus (B). 
Individual mortgages 
Group mortgage 
D. Partial ownership of enterprises and agn· 
cultural sector plus (B): ''rural expanded" town 
11,500 
11,000 
10,500 
10,000 
Individual mortages 9,200 
Group mortgage 8,800 
E. Phased tax-shelter ale plus (D): "rural 
expanded" town 
Individual mortgages 8,200 
Group mortgage 7,800 
To carry savings even further, the nonprofit new 
town might concentrate on selling houses and apart-
ments not to individuals but to group cooperatives. 
The initial effect of this wo.uld be a lower average 
interest rate on mortgages because of the more secure 
·combined financing. In our calculations, this might 
reduce required income by as much as $500 more. 
Over the long haul, moreover, no individual could 
refinance the house or apartment to bring its price up . 
to "true" market value. Cooperative ownership allows 
savings to be passed on from resident to resident, and 
prevents any individual from capturing the land-value 
increment which, in the nonprofit model, belongs to 
the community as a whole. 
The reductions in required income indicated in 
Table 4 are more significant than the figures them· 
selves imply. In most cases, decreasing the required 
income-because of the pyramid structure of income 
distribution-means that a lot more families become 
able to live in the town. For instance, the highest 
. . 
required average income in the profit case is $18,000. 
Fewer than 25 percent of Bay Area families earn this 
much. In the highest nonprofit case, the income is 
$11 ,500, which is about the Bay Area median, and 
the number of families reached is more than doubled. 
" 
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A new town developed through community own· 
ership, then, could provide housing and a decent 
environment for many more people than one devel· 
oped in the conve~tional way. The reasons are not 
hard to understand. In both models, development of 
the town creates wealth, which is reflected in high 
property values. Under private ownership, the devel· 
oper gets the income which ownership of the real 
estate produces. With community ownership, how· 
ever, the money returns to the residents-in our case, 
in the form .of cheaper housing. If the town's 
economy thrives, the residents will benefit directly 
and immediately becaQse money flows to the public 
treasury. There could never be a situation like that of 
Oakland, where corporate affluence stands in striking 
contrast with urban poverty. Describing the proto-
type in detail, we hope, has demonstrated why this 
should be so. 
The Wealth of Cities 
Our prototypical studies of new towns should not be , 
mistaken for plans for action. Community-owned 
new towns will find few friends among the developers 
and corporations which heretofore haYe regarded new 
towns as their private domain. Those who JTiight seek 
to . implement the idea-low-income community 
groups in particular-will seldom have the political 
muscle or the technical expertise to undertake so 
large a project. i 
The immediate practical implications of our study 
results have to do with existing tities like Oakland, 
where the heart· of the .. ur.ban crisis" lies. As our 
fmdings show, a program of community ownership 
can enable the people-community, municipality, 
whatever-to capture directly the wealth created by 
economic activity, and to use that wealth for their 
own benefit. It can provide a handle by which 
localities, largely bypassing state and federal political 
hierarchies, can begin to meet their citizens' eco· 
nomic needs. 
How might one begin to establish community 
ownership in urban areas? One starting point is to 
look at the mechanisms which could be available to a 
community-owned new city, and simply to apply 
them to existing localities. In California, for example, 
cities have the constitutional right to take over public 
utilities through purchase or eminent· domain. The 
city of Palo Alto earns $4 million a year through its 
ownership of utilities, while saving Its residents over 
one-third on their electric · billi. Similarly, It is 
estimated that· municipal takeover of the electric 
company in Berkeley would yield at least S 1 million 
in profits per year from the outset and well over $5 
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million in later years. Utility ownership may be an 
available option in other states as weD. 
The city can also partially determine the use of its 
land through public investment, zoning, building 
· permits, and other land-use controls. Public invest· . 
ment (for example, a new transit line or city college) 
often raises the value of land in its vicinity. If the city 
owns property in the area-whether acquired through 
eminent domain, tax foreclosure, or outright pur-
chase-it can rezone for comm~rcial use and rent out 
land, buildings, or both to businesses. Because it can 
charge higher rents than before the public develop-. 
ment took place, it captures the increment in value, 
precisely !lS it does in the new toWn prototype. The 
rents paid by the new tenants, as in the prototype; 
will flow to the public treasury, rather than padding 
the pockets of priwte entrepreneurs. 
Or, working from the other direction, the city can 
endeavor to reduce property values to landlords, for 
example by establishing strict rent control. A mort· 
gage or mortgage-insurance program could then facil· 
itate a transition to nonprofit or cooperative owner- . 
ship of housing. Tenants, for example, could organize 
themselves into a co-op. They could obtain financing 
guaranteed or provided by the city to buy their 
·homes from landlords, who would have to sell at 
lower prices than before rent control. 
Municipal ownership of businesses is another 
possibility. Even now, many big cities either operate 
directly or franchise a number of commercial ven-
tures: a municipal terminal and airport, along with 
their restaurants and other concessions; a marina; a 
stadium; parkirig lots and garages; and recreational 
·• 
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facilities. To the extent that these facilities do not 
serve and benefit the broad public (i.e., to the extent 
that they are used predominantly by upper-income 
groups) one can easily justify a policy in which they 
are operated or taken. over to maximize return of 
profits to the city. These profits can constitute a 
significant contribution to the general revenue, to be 
used for housing or other public purposes. 
To raise funds for purchase or development of real 
estate and enterprises, city governments have an 
imposing array of investment resources open to them: 
A city may have on hand a large accumulation of 
assets in the form of pension funds, accrual funds, 
and reserves. Usually~ these funds are· kept in' the 
form of commercial bank accounts, governmental 
notes, and commercial bonds (private utilities being a 
favorite because of their security). Almost invariably, 
these assets earn interest at or below the rates earned 
by private citizens in savings banks. They also are 
almost always invested outside the conimunity. 
The assets would be of greater use to the com-
munity as a whole if they were invested in com-
munity-owned ventures, perhaps through the sale of 
city-guaranteed bonds by each enterprise to the 
appropriate fund. The municipality's power to sell 
tax-exempt bonds on the open market at below-
market interest rates can also be used to finance 
public ventures. Bonds might be used, for instance;to 
establish a revolving loan fund for housing mortgages 
and rehabilitation. dr the city might establish a 
program to insure. commercial loans or mortgages, as 
the city. of Fresno, California, has done for second 
mortgages. · 
In any city, there are apt to be a number of private 
institutions with significant financial resources that 
are not used in any direct way to benefit the city. 
Unions, churches, private schools, and hospitals nor-
mally have resel'Ve funds, pension funds, and often 
endowments. The city might offer to guarantee 
repayment of any debt financing that local institu-
tions provided to support community-owned ven-
tures. Also, as with the new town prototype, the 
llmited·liartner tax-shelter arrangement for invest· 
ment may be open to city governments. A city could 
finance and construct a cable TV facility, then sell 
and mortgage it to a community-owned development 
corporation (CDC). The CDC would enter into 
limited partnership with outside investors who, as 
described, can take sizable tax deductions based on 
depreciation and other allowances. Part of the invest-
ment proceeds might go into additional TV facilities, 
but most of them would be available for other 
purposes. 
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Some questions remain. How likely is it in practice 
that community-owned ventures can generate sizable 
surpluses (profits) and compete successfully, when 
necessary, with private enterprises? Can community-
owned ventures provide a means of accumulating 
really large amounts of capital? 
There is a long-standing myth to the effect that 
only "private enterprise" can operate ventures effi-
ciently. Yet, there is much evidence to the contrary. 
Scores of cities-in northern California and the Pacific 
Northwest, for example-already own and operate 
electric and other utility systems, with service rates 
below those of the large private utility corporations. 
To the degree that community ownership becomes a 
vital political issue within a city, there should be an 
abundance of capable and experienced pe~le who 
dedicate their efforts to achieving its success. The 
issue, however, is not solely one of administrative 
efficiency; there are other advantages which com· 
munity-owned ventures have over private corpora· 
tions. Because municipal bonds are tax-exempt and 
are seen as secure investments, they can, as noted, be 
sold at lower interest rates than industrial and 
commercial bonds. Since debt financing constitutes 
the major source of capital funds for most ventures, 
public and private, this difference in interest rates (as 
the prototype shows) is highly significant. 
Another advantage is that municipally owned 
ventures are not required to pay state and federal 
taxes. It is also frequently possible to structure 
cooperatively owned .and nonprofit ventures so that 
they too pay little or no federal or state taxes, even 
when competing directly with private business. Loca· 
tional advantages should also result from the city's 
ability to control zoning and to exercise eminent 
domain. A community-owned industrial park, for 
example, could lease its facilities to outside corpora-
tions at rates competitive with those of privately 
owned and leased facilities, or with those built by the 
corporation itself. These advantages will also apply to 
the operation of community-owned ventures (e.g., a 
furniture factory or a supermarket) in direct con1peti· 
tion with private business. 
Political Control 
There is, of course, a catch. In the community-owned 
new town model, we assumed that the developer was 
a community group committed to realizing the bene-
fits of community ownership. In the examples above, 
we assumed that the city government wants to use 
every means at its disposal to expand its ownership 
and control of economic activities. In fact, ·it is 
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precisely this use of governmental power which we 
see as critical if community ownership is to go 
beyond the limitations of present experiments in 
community-owned enterprise. 
In both cases, the argument rests on large assump· 
tions. Indeed, the difficulties involved in creating 
community-owned new towns at the moment seem 
enormous. In existing cities, the potential for com-
munity ownership can be tapped only if those who 
favor it wrest . political control from entrenched 
interests. In this case, there are enough early-stage 
precedents to suggest that the time is ripe for such an 
attack. 
In Berkeley, the RIOT group in conjunction with 
the April Coalition has led a fight for community 
ownership of the local electric utility company, and is 
developing plans relating to the telephone and cable 
TV systems. Should the coalition gain a majority in 
the April elections this year, as seems a good bet, t~e 
electric power plan at least may come to fruition. In 
Rochester, New York, the black community organiza· , 
tion FIGHT has developed enough political strength 
to take effective control of both planning and 
redevelopment in a large urban renewal area; and it 
has lined up enough governmental support to initiate 
a community-owned electronics pllll'lt. In southwest 
Texas, a coalition of Mexican-American groups has 
attained electoral control in Crystal City. The coali-
tion is beginning to implement a series of proposals 
on decentralization of municipal services, and is 
exploring possibilities relating to community owner-
ship. And in Oakland itself, Bobby Seale is running 
for mayor, with the promise of substantial support 
from community groups. 
ln all such cases, eventual success will depend on 
moving from immediate, short-term issues of reform 
to the more comprehensive programs of community 
ownership. A political strategy for community owner· 
ship must build on issues of direct concern to most 
low and moderate-income urban residents. These 
include unemployment and high taxes; poor-quality, 
high-cost housing; the destruction of neighborhoods 
by urban renewal and highway construction pro· 
grains; and the inadequacies of public education and 
medical services. The problem is to demonstrate that 
all these relate back to the more basic problem of 
who controls the wealth. Under present arrange-
ments; revenues from real estate and businesses 
simply cannot be tapped by the city for the programs 
its residents demand. Community ownership may 
develop out of the demand for immediate changes in 
other areas, and eventually provide a way of meeting 
the needs. 
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Recent developments in Lynn, Massachusetts, pro· 
vide a useful example of this process. In Lynn, a 
community coalition has used its own newspaper to 
wage an intensive campaign against outside economic 
ownership and control, as represented by the huge 
General Electric plant and la,ge absentee landlords. 
The coalition's primary issue for organizing was rent 
control; the primary target, slumlords. After a good 
deal of work, a rent control referendum passed by a 
60 percent majority, and tenants gained control of 
the Rent Board. At the Same time, the coalition 
elected one of its members as mayor, and put in 
offic~ a city .council pledged to rent control and 
better housing. Given the nature of the campaign, the 
stage is now set for a move toward establishing 
community ownership of housing, the lOgical next 
step. And there are signs-early ones to be sure-that 
the coalition can move effectively in this direction. 
Our prototypical studies demonstrate the economic 
benefits of community ownership in new towns. But 
it is in existing cities where basic economic and 
political change is most likely to happen. The pros-
pects for change appear brighter now than in the past, 
as more and more hard-pressed city residents are 
coming to believe that they, as a community, can and 
should begin to assert control over their locality's 
economy. 
· "Commmunity control" in thi!' sense will not be 
an end in itself, but rather may be the first step 
toward a new social system of decentralized eco· 
nomic and political control. A high degree of citizen 
participation in government and workers' self· 
management in industry and commerce might merge 
to form real "people's institutions,"linked regionally 
and nationally, to control the wealth. Community 
• 
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ownership in this context is no doubt utopian. But 
the ineffectiveness of traditional piecemeal reforms 
suggests that the only practical way of dealing with 
present problems is a radical restructuring of our 
system of political power and economic control. 
We do not claim to know the precise forms this 
reordering will take. But we do argue that first steps 
must be taken now. We agree with Martin Buber that 
building a better society is a gradual process, 
whether before or after a political revolution. In 
Andr6 Gorz's words: "The working class will not 
unite politically or mount the barricades to get a ten 
percent wage increase or 50,000 more units of public 
housing." They do not need to, as John Case adds, 
"nor would the goal be worth the effort and the risk. 
Unless a vision of a better social order can be made 
concrete-and related to present possibilities-people 
will struggle for what they can get within the existing 
system. They will cast a skeptical eye,on radicals who 
call for an undefined transformation of society."8 
Community ownership is precisely a way of linking 
"present possibilities" to longer-term objectives. 
There obviously are obstacles. Those whose inter-
ests lie with the existing system will provide form-
idable political opposition, at one stage or another, to 
the development of the new forms. Private entre-
preneurs-landlords, developers, some businessmen-
will have little interest in supporting schemes which 
redirect the profits that would otherwise go to them. 
Large corporate interests-banks, utilities, manufac· 
turing concerns-will not welcome competition (or 
replacement) from community-owned ventures oper· 
ating on a nonprofit basis. It would be naive to 
assume that our proposals could be implemented 
without recurrent tests of political strength between 
their adherents and their opponents. In the long run, 
moreover, the establishment and continuation of 
community ownership at the local level will depend 
on corresponding changes in the regional and national 
political economies. Such changes will not be easy to 
come by. 
Yet the basic problems remain, and the logic of 
the argument holds. The range of issues suggested by 
our studies of new town models has direct relevance 
to the realities of the "urban crisis" we sketched at 
the outset. If new answers to the problems of cities 
are to be found, it is a safe bet that we will need to 
look well beyond the traditional discredited pro· 
grams. In our view, community ownership may be a 
significant approach toward effective solutions. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The basis for these studies is contained in the following 
joint Master of City Planning theses: New Town Develop· 
ment: Fintlncia/ Aspects, by Peter L. Bass, and New Town 
Development: Costs, by Edward M. Kirshner (Berkeley: 
University of California, 1971). This article is a condensed 
version of a paper in preparation for the Center for 
Community Economic Development (Cambridge). 
The authors are grateful to Peter Bass, Carl Sussman, 
and Cynthia K. Fredrick for their help in the preparation 
of the material in this article. 
2. We assume that the developer puts in 25 percent of the 
money; this is his "equity capital." The rest is borrowed 
at 8 percent interest. We base this interest rate and the 
return rate of 18-20 percent on expectations in an 
average 3 percent inflationary economy. 
3. For the mathematical formula used to determine CEF, 
see Bass-Kirshner theses, note 1. 
4. This assumes a nonprofit financing advantage as ex-
plained above. Eq1Jivalent fmancing arrangements result 
in savings ofroughly $2,250, or 9 perce!lt. 
5. Nonprofit financing advantage assumed here also. 
6. The property tax portion of this includes operating 
property taxes only, as distinct from property taxes that 
go to capital improvements. The latter are included in 
CEF. 
7. Annual housing costs are calculated assuming either 
25-year conventional mortgages at 7~ percent interest 
(with 20 percent down payment at an imputed 5 percent 
return) or FHA-insured 30-year mortgages at 7 percent 
plus ~ percent insurance (with a small down payment at 
5 percent). The additional allowance for real depreciation 
is 1 percent of initial building cost per year; and for 
maintenance, vacancies, and operating property taxes,-
about 65·70 cents per square foot of building space per 
year. 
8. See Buber,PDthl In Utop/Q (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); 
Gorz, Le Soc/Qlitmt Dlf{ldle (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 
1967); Case, "Workers' Control" in Gerry Hunnius, G. 
David Garson, and John Case, (Eds.), Workert' Control: 
A ReDder on lAbor Dnd SOcilll ChDnge (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1973). 
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